Within the first two decades of its existence, the newly designed institutions of the Fifth Republic did progressively bring about a much more stable pattern of 'bipolar multipartism' than had been characteristic of the Fourth Republic. The existence of two antagonistically related ideological camps, however, was dependent on the close association of the two major lines of cleavage, pitting against each other a secularsocialist/communist and a Catholic-anti-communist subculture. Since the late 1970s, however, the party system has been transformed in significant ways. The balance of power among the main left-wing and right-wing parties has changed. The Communist party and the UDF have lost ground to the Socialists and to the RPR, respectively.
Introduction
Within the first two decades of its existence, the newly designed institutions of the Fifth Republic did progressively bring about a much more stable pattern of 'bipolar multipartism' than had been characteristic of the Fourth Republic. The existence of two antagonistically related ideological camps, however, was dependent on the close association of the two major lines of cleavage, pitting against each other a secularsocialist/communist and a Catholic-anti-communist subculture. Since the late 1970s, however, the party system has been transformed in significant ways. The balance of power among the main left-wing and right-wing parties has changed. The Communist party and the UDF have lost ground to the Socialists and to the RPR, respectively.
Then, starting in the mid or late 1980s, the traditional pattern of opposition between the left-wing and right-wing blocs has also been altered by the electoral gains of the Front National. This party has appeared as a powerful new actor on the political space, giving rise to a 'tripolar' pattern of party competition. Finally, the fragmentation of the party system has also increased, at least temporarily, within the traditional left-wing and right-wing ideological blocs. Although no single explanation can account for the this phenomenon, we claim that the fragmentation of the party system is at least to some degree related to the emergence of new conflicts that fit uneasily in the traditional structure of oppositions represented in the party system. We argue in this paper that these developments are consequences of a more general transformation process in West European democracies. As shown by Kriesi et al. (2006; , globalization and the process of European integration lead to the emergence of a new structural conflict at the national level.
1 A new divide can be observed in several democracies, opposing those who benefit from the opening up of borders to those who feel threatened by the economic, cultural, and political integration. While the former support further international integration, the latter groups of citizens defend national boundaries, in a strategy of demarcation. In the process, new issues, such as European integration and immigration become more salient and are integrated into the traditional lines of cleavage. In general, the parties who appeal to the preferences of the 'losers' of globalization constitute the driving force of this transformation of the party system. As one of the oldest right-wing populist parties, the Front National has been among the first to adopt a discourse of 'differentialist nativism', which stresses the need to preserve distinct national traditions (Betz 2004 , see also Rydgren 2005) . Earlier than in other countries, the electoral success of the populist right in France has set in motion the transformation of the dimensional structure and the repositioning of the established parties within the transforming structure. The redefinition of cultural conflicts as well as the emergence of the issue of European integration on the political agenda has produced far-reaching changes in the structure of oppositions in the French party system.
While this conflict between 'integration' and 'demarcation' is not a French idiosyncrasy, its impact on the political space and party system has been conditioned in part by the institutions of the Fifth Republic. The two-round majoritarian system employed since 1958 has not impeded this evolution, because it creates weaker incentives than a pure majoritarian system for voters to desert candidates with no real chances of winning the election (see Blais and Loewen, this issue). The strategies pursued by the mainstream right in shaping the articulation of the new cultural division between integration and demarcation have also played an important role. In many ways, the RPR has paved the way for the later success of the Front National by first putting cultural protectionism on the political agenda in the 1970s and early 1980s, and then moving closer to the political centre thereafter. In particular, the convergence of the established right with the parties of the left on a pro-integrationist stance in the 2002 election seems to have boosted the populist right's electoral fortunes.
In this paper, we analyze the transformation of the French political space and the strategic positioning of parties within it by focusing on parties' issue positions during electoral campaigns. Our data come from content analyses of the newspaper coverage of election campaigns in 1978 in , 1988 in , 1995 in (Kriesi et al. 2006 . Based on this data, the main dimensions structuring the political space and the party positions within this space are determined using multidimensional scaling.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We first review the changes in the electoral strength of the various parties and ideological groupings since the new institutions of the Fifth Republic have been put into place in 1958. Then we discuss in more detail our hypothesis on how globalization affects the main dimensions structuring party positions, and how these developments may explain some of the observed changes in party strengths. In the following section, we introduce the dataset and methods used for our empirical analysis. Next comes the presentation of the corresponding empirical results. In the discussion of these results and of the transformation of the party system associated with globalization, we pay particular attention to the mediating role of the electoral system and to the consequences of party strategies. Finally, we conclude by discussing how Nicolas Sarkozy's partial appropriation of the right-wing populist agenda in the 2007 election may have impinged on Jean-Marie Le Pen's meagre showing in those elections. By assessing how durable the Front National's presence in the French party system is likely to be, we derive predictions on whether the configuration of political parties is likely to remain tripolar, or if a bipolar pattern of oppositions is likely to re-emerge after the transformation of the political space is consolidated.
From bipolar multipartism to tripolar competition
In the years after 1958, the two-round majoritarian formula used in presidential and parliamentary elections at the national level brought about a more stable pattern of 'bipolar pluralism' (Parodi 1989; Knapp 2002) (Parodi 1989) .
The evolution of the vote shares of the major parties is presented in Figure 1 , for the legislative elections, and in Figure 2 for the presidential contests. 2 Actually, these figures show a simplified version of this story, by grouping together from the beginning the various parties and movements that have later resulted in the formation of the PS, the UDF, and the RPR (later UMP). Only the PC already existed at the beginning of the Fifth Republic. The other three main parties were created after a complex series of splits and alliances, and numerous changes of names. By focusing on the five main parties or party groups, however, we can identify more easily some significant changes in the Up to the mid 1980s, thus, the political landscape was dominated by two parties or party groups on the left and two on the right. Electoral competition was mainly structured by a left-right dimension, opposing the PC and PS, on the one hand, to the UDF and RPR, on the other. Most important, this left-right dimension corresponded to both the religious and class cleavages. Citizens' attitudes and party preferences were strongly related to their social class and to their degree of religiosity (Boy and Mayer 1997; Mayer and Schweisguth 1989; Michelat and Simon 1989) . This conferred a high degree of stability to the pattern of bipolar multipartism characteristic of this period -at least as long as the traditional cleavages of class and religion were salient.
However, in the last two decades, the dominance of these four party groups has been called into question. Consequently, the system does not reduce the number of parties fielding candidates as strongly as a purely majoritarian system, and allows new political formations to compete that have little chances of winning a seat in the Assemblée Nationale, let alone the presidency. The institutional setting, as well as the personalized nature of presidential contests, thus allows for the emergence of new parties, such as the Front National. As the electoral formula is still a majoritarian one, it remains difficult for challenger parties to succeed.
Other institutional factors may also have facilitated the strengthening of the populist right, however. Elections using proportional representation take place at various levels, such as the municipalities and the regions, as well as in the elections for the European parliament. In fact, the Front National achieved its electoral breakthrough in a number of second-order elections in the early 1980s, first in a number of municipalities, and then in the 1984 European elections. Furthermore, the Socialist government changed the electoral system to proportional representation for the 1986 parliamentary elections so as to divide the right and prevent a victory of the RPR-UDF coalition, which is likely to have helped the Front National's institutionalization in the French party system.
However, despite substantially reduced chances of winning office when the two-round majoritarian system was reintroduced, the party's voter share did not recede after 1988.
In this context, it is worth mentioning another feature of the French political system:
When the president does not have a majority in parliament, and the system switches to cohabitation, it takes over certain traits of more consensual systems. In fact, the first occurrence of cohabitation in 1986 allowed the Front National took advantage of the possibility of portraying itself as the only 'real' opposition.
To sum up, institutional features of the Fifth Republic, as well as parties' strategic decisions, have provided a context in which the FN could reach significant electoral gains. However, it is of course not the institutions or parties' strategies which 'caused' such transformations in the party system. Rather, the change that brought about the observed developments, we argue, is the process of globalisation and of European integration. The next section develops this hypothesis in more detail. Whereas Grunberg and Schweisguth's (2003) analysis has revealed a tripartite structure of value orientations in France, we focus on how these values are anchored in a changing social structure as well as on the mobilization of these attitudes by political parties. In an analysis of the transformation of the political space, we then test the hypothesis that these processes have led to the rise of the Front National and to the emergence of a new cultural line of conflict in the French party system, resulting in a tripolar pattern of oppositions that closely resembles the attitudes of voters.
New structural potentials and the emergence of an 'Integration-Demarcation' divide
Globalisation can be conceived as a process of 'denationalisation' (Zürn 1998; Beisheim et al. 1999) , as a transformation and weakening of national borders. These evolutions are not entirely new phenomena; there are earlier examples of phases of intense economic and cultural exchanges. However, such evolutions have accelerated in the last two or three decades and the 'actual phase' of globalisation surpasses both quantitatively and qualitatively those of earlier epochs (Held et al. 1999: 425) . Most important for understanding the potential impact of this process on national politics is to see that its influence on citizens is not homogeneous. Some segments of a national community benefit from new opportunities, while others have more to loose and perceive the changes associated with globalisation as a threat. Globalisation leads to new oppositions, new disparities, and to the formation of groups of potential 'winners'
and 'losers'. These new oppositions result from at least three forms of competition:
economic, cultural, and political (for a more detailed discussion, see Kriesi et al. 2006; . Thus, the process of globalization leads to the formation of a new structural conflict, opposing those who benefit from this process to those who tend to loose in the course of the events. Generally, we expect 'losers' of the globalization process to seek to protect themselves through protectionist measures and through an emphasis on the maintenance of national boundaries and independence. 'Winners', by contrast, should support the opening up of the national boundaries and the process of international integration. The emergence of social groups that have diverging interests due to their location in the social structure leads to political potentials for the politicization of a new antagonism between 'integration' and 'demarcation' by political actors.
To the degree that established or new political parties articulate this new conflict by tying it to concrete political issues such as economic protectionism, opposition against immigration, or resistance against supranational integration, the structure of electoral competition will change and processes of realignment will be initiated. If parties try to mobilise segments of the electorate on the basis of issues linked with globalisation, we would expect the joint transformation of the main dimensions that structure the political space and of the configuration of party positions within this space. There are various scenarios how parties may mobilize the new political potentials, and the outcome will depend both on the strategic reaction of the established parties to the new issues as well as on the strategic context created by the electoral system. Generally, we expect the division between integration and demarcation to be most pronounced where new rightwing populist parties succeed in breaking into the party system or where established parties undergo a transformation that makes them virtually indistinguishable from parties of the populist right, as it has occurred in Switzerland and Austria.
Furthermore, the "space" available for new conflicts is determined both by the strength of the existing cleavages, as well as by the relationship between old and new conflicts.
How, then, does the new antagonism between integration and demarcation relate to the traditional conflicts that have characterized politics in Western Europe? In terms of economic policy making, the differing preferences between integration and demarcation have reinvigorated the established state-market divide. Because the winners and losers of globalization and of the strategy of economic liberalization pursued in the European Union differ from the social groups hitherto divided into a pro-market and a pro-state position, however, the social structural basis of this conflict has been transformed.
Rather than the traditional class cleavage, which opposed the working class and the more well off classes, this conflict may today be more adequately labelled a statemarket cleavage, that cuts across these two groups. In terms of the cultural dimension of conflict in Western European party systems, which had traditionally been stamped by the religious cleavage, the redefinition of conflicts has been even more far-reaching, and has involved the emergence of new ideological conflicts. It has in fact been the waning of the religious cleavage that has opened the way for a two-fold transformation of political space and the emergence of a new cultural divide ).
The first transformation of the party political space has been triggered by the appropriation of the agenda of the new social movements of the left by New Left and Ecologist parties in the 1970s and 1980s, as Kitschelt (1994) has laid out. In the French case, the withering away of the religious cleavage is mirrored in the decline of the UDF at the expense of the Gaullist RPR and (later) the Front National, which we have discussed in the preceding section. While class voting has not declined markedly, Knutsen (2004: 108-9 
The transformation of the French political space
We analyse the transformation of the French political space by examining parties' issue positions during national electoral campaigns, and then determining the broader dimensions that underlie parties' policy-statements. National campaigns constitute a crucial moment for observing changes in electoral alignments (Martin 2000 This data provides central information that allows us to determine how the political space is structured and which positions parties take in this space. Our aim is thus to determine how many dimensions are needed to provide a satisfactory representation of the positions of parties and issues. We rely for this on multidimensional scaling, a statistical method that makes possible a graphical representation of the positions of objects in a space, based on information regarding the distances or dissimilarities between these objects (Kruskal and Wish 1978; Borg and Groenen 1997). 8 The corresponding results are presented in Figure 3 .
Each of the panels shows the configuration of issue and party positions for one election.
In order to highlight what the main results relevant for our research question are, we have connected the issues categories that we interpret as the poles of the economic and cultural dimensions, respectively. 9 These axes are not part of the solution, but are simply added in order to facilitate to some extent the interpretation of the results.
Consequently, these dimensions may be more or less integrated, depending on the way parties combine their position regarding economic and cultural issues.
It should be pointed out that due to our restricted focus on the supply side of politics, we do not study cleavages directly in this article, which would require the inclusion of demand-side data to determine the social structural underpinnings of voter alignments, according to Bartolini and Mair's (1990) contribute to the success of the Front National, as Kitschelt (1995) had suggested.
As far as the established right's strategy towards the right-wing populist challenger is concerned, these have shown quite a degree of variation, as a close look at parties' issue positions (see Table A .1) suggests. From 1988 on, the established right has tempted to win back some of the voters it had lost to the Front National's by issuing proposals against immigration. As a consequence, the main difference between the Front National and the RPR and UDF is that they approve cultural liberalism, and not so much their European issue crosscuts alignments based on the traditional economic divide (Perrineau 1996) .
Conclusion
Summing up, the significant developments resulting in a transformation of political space and the rise of the Front National can be summarized under three broad headings:
(1) Between 1978 and 1988, we witness a transformation of the cultural divide.
Originally characterized by an opposition between cultural liberalism and neoconservatism, a new demarcation pole has emerged, which combines culturally protectionist and exclusionist stances. This is in line with our hypothesis that the issues pertaining to the integration-demarcation divide are integrated into the already existing cultural divide. In the course of this transformation, the RPR's programmatic profile has evolved from a culturally protectionist and nationalist orientation to an acceptance of cultural liberalism, levelling out the differences between itself and the centrist UDF.
The RPR thereby left unoccupied a political space that provided fertile ground for the right-wing populist challenger, resulting in a reconfiguration of the party system.
In the forefront of the 2002 presidential elections, large parts of the remaining UDF then joined together with the RPR to form the UMP, first standing for 'Union pour une majorité présidentielle', then rebapticized 'Union pour un mouvement populaire' after the election. In part, this can be attributed to a long-term convergence in programmatic profile. But it also means that the parties of the right reacted more quickly than the left to the challenge posed by party system fragmentation under the two-round majoritarian formula (Grunberg 2006) . France is therefore clearly a case that corroborates Ignazi's (1992; 2003) In sum, our analysis of party positions has revealed a tripartite structure of oppositions, as suggested by Grunberg and Schweisguth (2003) in their analysis of voter attitudes, and called into question by Andersen and Evans (2003) . 
